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I. INTRODUCTION
Cultural bias, statutory law, and case law have severely restricted
the relative rights of homosexuals in this country. "Parallelling the
Black Experience in America, homosexual persons have been system-
atically denied fundamental liberties extended to all other individu-
als."1 Gays and lesbians have experienced discrimination in diverse
areas including business, public housing, insurance, credit, immigra-
tion, parenting, and marriage. They have also been denied profes-
sional licenses and security clearances. 2
1. Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimization of Homaphobia in
America, 30 How. L.J. 829, 830 (1987). See also Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980).
2. Comment, supra note 1, at 830-32 nn.13-25. See Karst, supra note 1, at 682-86 for
a discussion of the loss of fundamental material benefits which necessarily results
from the denial of legal marital status to homosexual couples.
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In Bowers v. Hardwick,3 a 1986 homosexual rights decision, the
United States Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 margin, determined that a
state statute which criminalized acts of sodomy between consenting
adults was constitutional (at least as applied to homosexual sodomy).
In Watkins v. U.S. Army, 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently attempted to minimize the damage to civil rights done by Hard-
wick. This Note first presents the facts, reasons, and holdings of
Hardwick and Watkins. The Note then demonstrates that both opin-
ions grossly manipulated precedent to achieve what each court felt
was a just result. Finally, the Note examines the dichotomy of judicial
philosophy represented by the cases: Hardwick sanctioned the legal
abuse of homosexuals in the name of a majoritarian notion of sexual
morality, while Watkins attempted to protect that same minority
from persecution by fashioning a just result despite unjust precedent.
II. THE CASES
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
Hardwick, after being charged with violation of Georgia's anti-sod-
omy law, challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia statute.5 The
Court construed the issue narrowly, determining "whether the Fed-
eral Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time."6
In a decision which has been criticized for a lack of principled anal-
ysis,7 the Court refused to extend constitutional privacy protection to
3. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)(also reported at 478 U.S. 186, preliminary printing), reh'g
denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986). For a listing of 21 states which have decriminalized
sodomy and a brief description of the sodomy statutes of 24 states, see Note, Be-
hind the Facade: Understanding the Potential Extension of the Constitutional
Right to Privacy to Homosexual Conduct, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1233, 1234, 1235 nn.8-9
(1986). (Note that a few states proscribe only homosexual sodomy.)
4. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988).
5. Sodomy, under the Georgia statute, is any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another. The penalty is one to 20 years
imprisonment. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Hardwick challenged
the statute even though the State did not seek prosecution. After dismissal for
failure to state a claim, Hardwick appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed, holding that the ninth amendment and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment proscribed state regulation of the "private
and intimate association" of homosexual activity. Id. at 2843. The court remanded
the case-the state would have to show that the statute was the most narrowly
drawn means of achieving a compelling government interest. Id. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick- Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54
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the private, intimate behavior of homosexuals.8 The Court rejected
the court of appeal's reasoning that Supreme Court precedent had cre-
ated a constitutional right of privacy which extends to homosexual
sodomy.9 The Court indicated that the right of privacy extends only to
matters of family, marriage, and procreation:10
No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court
of Appeals or by respondent. Moreover, any claim that these cases neverthe-
less stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable.1 1
Furthermore, the Court determined that the occurrence of sodomy
in the privacy of the home did not insulate it from state proscription.
Stanley v. Geo7rpia,12 which held that conviction for possession of ob-
scenity in the home was unconstitutional, was declared inapplicable
because that holding was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment.
The right pressed upon us here has no similar support in the text of
the Constitution."' 3 The majority also noted that other victimless
crimes such as possession of drugs, firearms, and stolen goods in the
home are not constitutionally protected.14 The Court concluded: "[it]
would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right [of adult,
consensual sexual conduct] to homosexual conduct while leaving ex-
posed to prosecution, adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
though they are committed in the home. We are unwilling to start
down that road."15
In addition to its determination that recent precedent confers no
right to engage in intimate homosexual conduct, the majority relied on
the history of homosexual discrimination to justify its holding. "Pro-
U. Cm. L. REV. 648 (1987); Note, Bowers v. Hardwick- An Incomplete Constitu-
tional Analysis, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1100 (1987).
8. The Court specifically declined to address the constitutionality of criminalization
of private, consensual acts of sodomy between married or unmarried heterosex-
ual couples. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986). John and Mary
Doe, plaintiffs in the original action, also challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. They alleged that the statute and Hardwick's arrest "chilled and de-
terred" their freedom to engage in such activity. The district court held that the
Does had no standing and the court of appeals affirmed. The Does did not chal-
lenge the denial of standing before the Supreme Court. Id. at 2842 n.2.
9. Id. at 2843.
10. The Court distinguished the line of cases relied on by the court of appeals as
dealing only with child rearing and education, family relationships, procreation,
marriage, contraception, and abortion. Id. at 2843-44.
11. Id. at 2844.
12. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
14. Id.
15. Id. The Court, by implication, saw no material distinction between private homo-
sexual sodomy by consenting adults and acts of incest and adultery.
1989]
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scriptions against [homosexual sodomy] have ancient roots."1 6 In re-
sponse to Hardwick's assertion that there must be at least a rational
basis for the law and that "the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unac-
ceptable" is an inadequate rationale, the Court declared: "We do not
agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 states
should be invalidated on this basis."17
The Hardwick majority did not consider the equal protection
clause in its analysis. In Watkins v. U.S. Army,1 8 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals did consider an equal protection challenge to regula-
tions which banned homosexuals from the United States Army. The
court held the regulations were unconstitutional.
B. Watkins v. U.S. Army
Watkins enlisted in the Army in 1967 at the age of nineteen. He
indicated to the Army at that time that he had homosexual tenden-
cies. Watkins served fourteen years (1967-1981). His homosexuality
was common knowledge. Prior to 1981, the Army made numerous in-
vestigations of Watkins's homosexual conduct. He was cleared on
every occasion and received high ratings throughout his career. His
superior officers testified that he was an excellent officer and that his
known homosexuality did not disrupt Army affairs. In 1980, however,
Watkins's security clearance for a particular project was withdrawn
due to his homosexuality, and in 1981 the Army created new regula-
tions which required the discharge of all homosexuals regardless of
merit and barred their reenlistment.19 The Army then discharged
Watkins because he had stated that he was homosexual.2 0 Watkins
filed suit in district court where the Army was enjoined from dis-
charging him. The court held the discharge was barred by the Army's
regulation against double jeopardy. (Discharge proceedings had been
brought in 1975.)
The Army subsequently denied Watkins's reenlistment applica-
tion2 1 and was again enjoined by the district court. On appeal, the
16. Id. at 2844. See also Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, id. at 2847.
17. Id. at 2846-47.
18. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988).
19. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1988). The regulations are
AR 635-200, Ch. 15 (discharge) and AR 601-280, 2-21(c) (reenlistment). See id.
at 1336 n.11 for relevant sections of these regulations.
20. Id. at 1332. Supplementary findings by the Army that Watkins had engaged in
homosexual acts with other soldiers after 1968 were ruled invalid. On appeal, the
Army only cited Watkins's 1968 affidavit as evidence of homosexual conduct. Id.
21. AR 601-280, 1 2-21(c) bars reenlistment of homosexuals. Watkins's 1968 affidavit
admitting to homosexual acts is the only evidence the court of appeals accepted
regarding the Army's finding of homosexual conduct. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847
F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Army could not be ordered to
violate its own regulations absent a finding that the regulations were
unconstitutional.22 On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment for the Army and Watkins appealed.
The court of appeals first disposed of Watkins's administrative pro-
cedure, petition clause, and due process entrapment claims. 23 Wat-
kins's first amendment claim was dismissed because the Army's
determination of his homosexuality was based, in addition to his ad-
mission of being gay, on his 1968 admission to engaging in homosexual
acts.2
The court then addressed Watkins's fifth amendment equal protec-
tion claim. The court conceded that Bowers v. Hardwick and its own
precedent precluded a finding under "a due process or equal protec-
tion claim that the Army's regulations impinge on an asserted funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." 25 However, the court
reasoned that unlike the Georgia sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, the Army regulations discriminated against homosexuals based
on their sexual orientation.26 Because the focus of the regulations
was found to be sexual orientation rather than conduct, the court ap-
plied equal protection analysis to the regulations:
First, we must decide whether the regulations in fact discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation. Second, we must decide which level of judicial scrutiny
applies by asking whether discrimination based on sexual orientation burdens
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which would make it subject respectively, to
strict or intermediate scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cieburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-41, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). If
the discrimination burdens no such class, it is subject to ordinary rationality
review. Id. Finally, we must decide whether the challenged regulations sur-
vive the applicable level of scrutiny by deciding whether, under strict scrutiny,
the legal classification is necessary to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est .... 
2 7
The court first concluded that the Army regulations did discrimi-
nate against homosexuals based on their sexual orientation. The regu-
lations provided for discharge or denial of reenlistment application
based on either homosexual conduct or admitted homosexual orienta-
22. Id. at 1334.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1334-35.
25. Id. at 1345. The court's precedent referred to is Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and Hatheway v. Secretary of the
Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). The court
distinguished BeIler as a substantive due process case. Hatheway dealt with only
the first of two equal protection questions. The case foreclosed a finding that the
regulations impinge on any fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct,
but did not foreclose a finding that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir. 1988).
26. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. Id. at 1335-36 (footnotes omitted).
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tion; however, the court reasoned that a finding of homosexual con-
duct was merely used as an indicator of homosexual status. The intent
of the discharge and reenlistment regulations was to ban homosexu-
ally oriented persons from the Army.28
The court then considered the factors which the Supreme Court
has declared pertinent to a suspect class inquiry and concluded:
(1) Homosexuals have "suffered a history of purposeful discrimina-
tion." This discrimination has been similar to that faced by other
groups considered to be suspect classes such as aliens and persons of a
particular national origin. 2 9
(2) "[T]he discrimination embodies a gross unfairness that is suffi-
ciently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to term it invid-
ious." 30 This conclusion was based on findings that: (a) "[s]exual
orientation plainly has no relevance to a person's 'ability to perform or
contribute to society;' "31 (b) homosexuals as a class have suffered
unique disabilities due to irrational prejudice;32 (c) the trait which de-
fines the class, sexual preference, is immutable.33
(3) Homosexuals, as a group, lack the political power to effectively
advocate a redress of official discrimination.3 4
The court concluded that homosexuals are a suspect class. The
regulations were therefore subjected to strict scrutiny, under which
they could be upheld only if necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernment interest.
The court determined that the Army's justifications were not com-
pelling "because they illegitimately cater to private biases."35 The
Army's assertion that heterosexual bias against homosexuals within
its ranks is disruptive and therefore justifies exclusion of homosexuals
was compared to earlier efforts by the Army to separate blacks due to
racial tensions. "[he Supreme Court has decisively rejected the no-
tion that private prejudice against minorities can ever justify official
discrimination, even when those prejudices create real and legitimate
problems." 36 Similarly, in response to the Army's assertion that its
regulations merely codify society's consensus that homosexuality is
evil, the court stated: "Yet, even accepting arguendo this proposition
that anti-homosexual animus is grounded in morality (as opposed to
prejudice masking as morality), equal protection doctrine does not
28. Id. at 1336-39. For relevant sections of the Army's discharge and reenlistment
regulations, see id. at 1336, n.11.
29. Id. at 1345.
30. Id. at 1346.
31. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
32. Id. at 1346-47.
33. Id. at 1347-48.
34. Id. at 1348-49.
35. Id. at 1350.
36. Id. at 1350-51 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
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permit notions of majoritarian morality to serve as compelling justifi-
cation for laws that discriminate against suspect classes." 37
The court briefly considered the Army's claims that emotional re-
lationships between homosexuals of different rank would erode disci-
pline and that homosexual soldiers would be susceptible to blackmail
and thereby constitute a security risk. The regulations were found to
be poorly tailored to advance the Army's interest in avoiding such
risks. 38
The court concluded that the Army regulations discriminated
against a suspect class, were not necessary to promote a compelling
government interest, and violated the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. The case was remanded to the district
court with instructions to declare the regulations constitutionally void.
The order also authorized an injunction to require the Army to disre-
gard Watkins's sexual orientation in its consideration of his reenlist-
ment application.3 9
IH. THE GROSS MANIPULATION OF PRECEDENT BY
HARD WICK AND WATKINS
Both Hardwick and Watkins are opinions tainted by prior prece-
dent. The Supreme Court's privacy cases indicate that private sexual
conduct between consenting adults should be protected from govern-
ment scrutiny. Yet Hardwick holds to the contrary (at least in the
case of homosexual sexual conduct). Watkins holds that homosexuals
are a suspect class under the equal protection clause; however, Hard-
wick seems to preclude such a finding. In both cases, prior precedent
was distinguished and manipulated to achieve what each court felt was
the correct result.
In another respect, however, the cases stand in stark contrast. In
Hardwick, the Supreme Court sanctifies laws made in the name of
majority morality which necessarily impact in a harsh manner on a
historically persecuted minority. By implication, the prejudice and
bias of a perceived'majority are sufficient reasons to justify such laws.
In Watkins, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted
to distinguish the difficult precedent of Hardwick in order to protect
that same persecuted minority from majority abuse. This contrast in
purpose of the Hardwick and Watkins courts reflects a fundamental
philosophical dichotomy regarding the proper mandate of the courts.
The Watkins holding also illustrates another central theme of Ameri-
can judicial history: sometimes the courts manage to achieve a just re-
sult despite bad law.
37. Id. at 1351.
38. Id. at 1352.
39. Id. at 1353.
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A. Hardwick and the Right of Privacy
The source and substance of a constitutional right of privacy is an
intensely debated issue. Strict constitutional constructionists argue
that no provision of the document explicitly provides a right of pri-
vacy, while others have found support for such a right in various pro-
visions of the Constitution and in the intent of the founding fathers.40
The Hardwick majority clearly placed itself on the conservative side
of the debate:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to dis-
cover new fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause. The
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the lan-
guage or design of the Constitution.
4 1
The Court, however, is saddled with its own line of cases which ex-
tends the right of privacy beyond any specific textual provisions of the
Constitution.42
The majority argument is flawed in at least two respects. First, the
Court selectively relied on the language of two of its privacy cases to
define the reach of the right to privacy. The Court declared the reach
of the right to privacy to be confined to those "liberties that are 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty or
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed,' "43 and as those liberties
which are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'44
The Court found that these formulas confer no right of privacy to the
private sexual conduct of homosexuals since "[p]roscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots."45 Language in other Court opinions,
however, indicates that the proper reach of the right of privacy is
grounded in other concerns: the value of individual autonomy, the
freedom to define one's own identity, individual happiness, personal
control of intimate associations, and the right secured by the fourth
amendment-to be secure in one's home from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion.46
40. For a brief history of the evolution of a constitutional right of privacy, see Wat-
son, The Ninth Amendment. Source of a Substantive Right to Privacy, 19 J. MAR-
sHALL L. REV. 959 (1986).
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
42. For a listing of the cases, see id. at 2843. The Court extended protection for pos-
session of obscene material in the home in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
The Hardwick majority argued that Stanley was grounded in the first amend-
ment and therefore did not support Hardwick's privacy claim; however, Justice
Blackmun pointed out that Stanley was indeed decided on privacy grounds. Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
44. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 2850-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). John Stuart Mill long ago argued
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In its effort to halt the flow of illegitimate privacy rights, the Court
awkwardly attempted to confine the rights conferred by this line of
cases to the narrow fact patterns of the cases themselves. "[Nione of
the rights announced in these cases bears any resemblance to the
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sod-
omy that is asserted in this case."47
Surely, however, the right of sexual intimacy is as necessary for
individual liberty as the right to use contraceptives, to possess obscen-
ity in one's home, or to choose an abortion.48 Despite presumed no-
tions of majority morality, and a long history of public abhorrence of
the act,49 the Court has recognized a woman's right to choose an abor-
tion. The right to choose whether to bear a child has no explicit tex-
tual support in the Constitution. The right is based on recognition of
the importance of individual autonomy-the right to control one's
own body. This same interest justifies recognition of the right of
homosexuals to engage in private, consensual acts of sodomy. Indeed,
the right to choose an abortion is less compelling because abortion is
not a victimless act. The Hardwick Court's analysis, or lack of analy-
sis, is tainted by its own precedent.
The second flaw in the Court's argument is its reliance on histori-
cal discrimination as proof that private homosexual intimacy is not an
essential liberty. Sodomy laws, while often facially applicable to both
that there must be a realm of private morality and immorality which is simply
not the law's business. Mill, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS (1975). The right of
privacy also can be understood to be simply the right to be left alone. See Karst,
supra note 1. Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the Court's precedent estab-
lishes an individual's right to make decisions which affect his and his family's
destiny. He further asserted that precedent extends the right of privacy to
nonreproductive sexual conduct by both married and unmarried adults. Since
the Georgia statute facially proscribed both homosexual and heterosexual sod-
omy, it could not be enforced as written. Therefore, the State had the burden of
justifying a selective application of its law. Since homosexuals must have the
same liberty interests as heterosexuals, and bias and ignorance alone are not suf-
ficient to justify selective application of the law;, the State had not met its burden.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2857-59 (1986).
47. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
48. For a discussion of the grounds for the right of possession of pornography in one's
home, see supra note 42.
49. See Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORATY OF ABOR-
TION (1970). Noonan also discusses the impact of the law on morality.
Legislation which enforced slavery, for example, systematically formed
American moral judgments about blacks. Court decisions which re-
quired desegregation shaped a new conscience for blacks and whites.
Law prohibiting abortion had taught a view of life and responsibility, and
the law cannot be abolished without substantial impact on the moral
consciousness of Americans.
Noonan, Introduction, in THE MORAIrv OF ABORTION x, xi (1970). According to
Noonan's argument, Hardwick, which sanctions anti-homosexual laws, encour-
ages private prejudice against homosexuals.
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homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, in effect proscribe a primary
form of sexual intimacy of only homosexuals. Furthermore, the Court
explicitly refused to consider the constitutionality of sodomy laws as
applied to heterosexuals. Therefore, when the Court stated "proscrip-
tions against that conduct have ancient roots," the proscribed "con-
duct" at issue was the intimate sexual behavior of homosexuals alone.
It is inconceivable that even the present Court would explicitly rely on
historical discrimination against blacks and women, even in the form
of facially nondiscriminatory laws, to determine which of their liber-
ties are essential and which are not.
B. Watkins: Homosexuals as a Suspect Class
The Hardwick holding was tainted by the Supreme Court's own
precedent. The Watkins opinion is similarly marred by Hardwick. To
achieve an intuitively just result, the court arguably distorted the
message of Hardwick. In doing so, the court made two unsupportable
assumptions: (1) Watkins is distinguishable from Hardwick because
the Army regulations discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation,
or status, rather than conduct; and (2) Hardwick does not foreclose a
finding that homosexuals are a suspect class under equal protection
doctrine.
1. The Status/Conduct Distinction
The attempt to distinguish Watkins from Hardwick on the basis of
status and conduct contains two flaws. First, the conduct which argua-
bly defines the class is illegal.50 Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, observed
that homosexuals are different than other groups, such as women and
blacks, who have received protection under the equal protection
clause. Homosexuals are necessarily defined by their sexual conduct.
Since that conduct may constitutionally be prohibited by the states, it
is antithetical to assume the group has special protection under the
Constitution.5 ' (While it may be argued that homosexuality encom-
passes sexual contact other than legally defined acts of sodomy, the
result of the argument may necessarily be that only celibate homosex-
uals warrant constitutional protection.)
The second flaw in the status/conduct distinction is the court's ar-
gument that the focus of the Army regulations is homosexual orienta-
tion rather than conduct. The regulations do allow for discharge
based solely on admission of homosexuality; however, they also permit
50. Congress has criminalized sodomy by military personnel in 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1982).
51. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
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discharge for homosexual acts alone.52 Moreover, the Army's asserted
objective was to exclude those who engage in homosexual acts or are
likely to engage in such acts.53 The discharge of an admitted homosex-
ual is consistent with that goal. The Army's policy of toleration of
whimsical homosexual acts by heterosexual soldiers54 is consistent
with its desire to exclude only those who are likely to continue to en-
gage in such activity.55 Furthermore, Watkins had admitted to engag-
ing in homosexual sodomy while in the Army.5 6 In the majority's
dismissal of Watkins's first amendment claim, it stated: "Since Wat-
kins admitted in 1968 that he had engaged in homosexual acts, he was
presumed under the regulations to have a homosexual orientation,
and could not rebut that presumption because his orientation was, in
fact, homosexual."57
As Judge Reinhardt observed in dissent, "under the majority's sta-
tus/conduct distinction, Watkins could be excluded from the Army
based on regulations slightly more narrowly drawn so as to target only
the class of persons who have en'gaged in homosexual conduct."5 8
Although Watkins achieved a just result, the effect of the holding is
limited.
2. Homosexuals as a Suspect Class After Hardwick
The Army argued that Hardwick precluded a finding that its regu-
lations denied Watkins equal protection of the law. The Watkins
court's response was: "The Court's holding was limited to this due
process question. The parties did not argue and the Court explicitly
did not decide the question whether the Georgia sodomy statute might
violate the equal protection clause."59 However, the court seemingly
ignored the obvious; if the Hardwick Court saw a valid equal protec-
tion issue, they would have raised it.
[Tihe procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the Court of Ap-
peals' judgment if there is any ground on which respondent may be entitled to
relief... It is a well settled principle of law that "a complaint should not be
dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the particu-
lar legal theory he advances, for the court is under a duty to examine the
complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible
theory."6
0
52. Id. at 1336-38 n.11. The discharge and reenlistment regulations are alike on this
point.
53. Id. at 1362 (Reinbardt, J. dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1361-62 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1353 n.1 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1335.
58. Id. at 1361 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1339-40.
60. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2849 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).
19891
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The Watkins court further assumed that Hardwick allowed state
proscription of sodomy, but not homosexual orientation. (The Georgia
statute facially applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.)
This assumption ignores the explicit focus of the Court's opinion,
which was homosexual sodomy. The Court stated that "majority sen-
tinents about the morality of homosexuality" and the "presumed be-
lief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral" were adequate justifications for the law.61 In dissent, Jus-
tice Blackmun noted that Georgia's stated interest was the prosecu-
tion of homosexual sodomy despite the fact that the statute was
equally applicable to heterosexual sodomy.62 Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, noted that the Georgia Attorney General considered the stat-
ute to be unconstitutional if applied to a married, heterosexual
couple. 6
3
Based on its erroneous assumption that Hardwick sanctioned state
proscription of both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, but did not
permit state proscription of homosexual orientation, the Watkins
court asserted: "While it is not our role to question Hardwick's con-
cerns about substantive due process and specifically the right to pri-
vacy, these concerns have little relevance to equal protection
doctrine."64 The focus of the court's analysis was thereby shifted to
whether the Army regulations had a disproportionate impact on a par-
ticular group. "The constitutional requirement of evenhandedness ad-
vances the political legitimacy of majority rule by safeguarding
minorities from majoritarian oppression." 65 But majority oppression,
in the form of coerced compliance with perceived popular codes of
moral sexual behavior, is exactly what Hardwick seems to stand for.
The obsessive focus of Hardwick on homosexual sodomy alone, and
the Court's refusal to consider the equal protection issue seem to pre-
clude a finding that homosexuals are a suspect class.66 In order to
achieve a just result, the Watkins court blatantly misconstrued Hard-
wick. A 1987 D.C. Circuit case, which upheld the FBI's refusal to hire
a person because she was a homosexual, gives a more honest appraisal
of Hardwick. The court stated:
It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct
that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause.... If the Court was unwilling to object to
61. Id. at 2846 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2858 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that the pri-
vate sexual conduct of both married and unmarried heterosexual persons is pro-
tected under the due process right of privacy by the Court's own precedent. Id. at
2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. Id.
66. Judge Reinhardt also makes this point. Id. at 1353-56 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open
to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the
class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.
67
Six states criminalize only homosexual sodomy.68 It is improbable
that the Supreme Court would invalidate these laws under equal pro-
tection doctrine given its holding in Hardwick. As Judge Reinhardt
stated in Watkins: "The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the
Court's willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions
of the government, are clear."
69
In reality, the Watkins majority hung its hat on two weak pegs:
(1) the Army regulations exclude homosexuals for admitted homosex-
ual orientation, not only homosexual acts; and (2) the regulations pro-
scribe homosexual acts other than those commonly included in
sodomy laws.70 Even if Watkins cannot be discharged or denied reen-
listment after the Watkins decision, it is a hollow victory for homo-
sexuals in the Army. The Army must narrow the language of its
regulations only slightly to meet the Watkins requirements.
There is no reason to suppose that Watkins will not continue to be
forthright and candid with the Army. Under rewritten regulations he
could easily be discharged again if he once more admits to engaging in
acts of sodomy.71 After Watkins, homosexual soldiers are left in the
same unjust dilemma: they can remain celibate or try to keep their
sexual orientation a secret. In fact, the ultimate, practical design of
Army regulations and state sodomy laws may be to keep gays and les-
bians where certain segments of society think they belong-in the
closet.7 2
67. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Watkins court flatly
disagreed with the Padula analysis. "Paduld's reasoning... rests on the false
premise that Hardwick approves discrimination against homosexuals." Watkins
v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345 (9th Cir. 1988).
68. Miller, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scru-
tiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 800, 801
(1984).
69. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
70. The regulations also address forms of sexual contact such as kissing, holding
hands, caressing, and hand-genital contact. Id. at 1346.
71. The Army may be barred from discharging or denying reenlistment to Watkins
based on his past admissions due to its rules on double jeopardy. See id. at 1332
n.4.
72. In fact, the Army's asserted concern is that heterosexual prejudice against homo-
sexuals within its ranks disrupts its affairs. The Army knows that homosexuals
are in the ranks, but does not want their orientation to become known. Id. at
1350.
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IV. HARDWICK V. WATKINS: A DICHOTOMY OF JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY
Both Hardwick and Watkins grossly manipulate precedent: Hard-
wick, by its refusal to recognize that its prior line of privacy cases cre-
ates a larger category of fundamental rights than the narrow fact
patterns the cases represent; Watkins, by its stubborn insistence that
Hardwick leaves room to designate homosexuals a suspect class.73
The judicial philosophy represented by these cases, however, is funda-
mentally different.
The Hardwick holding is an explicit statement that historical legal
discrimination and majority notions of sexual morality are sufficient
justifications for laws which deprive a minority of the right to engage
in private, consensual sexual conduct.74 To argue that the Court's
holding does or does not also allow states to ban heterosexual sodomy
begs the question. Sodomy laws deprive homosexuals of their primary
forms of sexual expression; common forms of heterosexual intimacy
are not criminalized. Hardwick, in effect, allows a presumed majority
to criminalize conduct which largely defines the sexual identity of a
large segment of our society. Sodomy laws, by their very existence,
even if rarely applied, deny homosexuals the right to be first-class
citizens.
In contrast, Watkins flatly rejects majoritarian notions of sexual
morality as legitimate bases for state-sponsored discrimination. In re-
sponse to the Army's assertion that gays in its ranks are a source of
embarrassment and disruption, the court stated: "[T]he Supreme
Court has decisively rejected the notion that private prejudice against
minorities can ever justify official discrimination, even when those
private prejudices create real and legitimate problems."75 In answer
to the Army's claim that its regulations reflected the moral consensus
of society, the court responded: "Yet, even accepting arguendo this
proposition that anti-homosexual animus is grounded in morality (as
opposed to prejudice masking as morality), equal protection doctrine
73. The analysis of homosexuals as a suspect class by the Watkins court is itself ap-
parently sound, and is in accord with prior Supreme Court applications of the
doctrine. "The majority opinion concludes that under the criteria established by
equal protection case law, homosexuals must be treated as a suspect class. Were
it not for Hardwick... I would agree, for in my opinion the group meets all the
applicable criteria." Id. at 1356 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, notes that Georgia's
selective application of its sodomy law raises the issue of discriminatory enforce-
ment. Thus, Hardwick may have had a claim under the equal protection clause
with reference to the issue of whether homosexuals are a suspect class); Miller,
supra note 68; Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexu-
ality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
75. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1988).
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does not permit notions of majoritarian morality to serve as compel-
ling justification for laws that discriminate against suspect classes." 76
Hardwick and Watkins dramatically underscore a fundamental di-
chotomy in judicial philosophy: whether courts should merely reflect
"majoritarian notions of morality" or whether courts should also pro-
tect disadvantaged groups from the moralistic prejudices of a majority.
While one goal is surely more popular, the other seems more
worthy.77
V. CONCLUSION
Another fundamental issue is raised by Watkins and its response
to the difficult precedent of Hardwick. Must courts obey precedent
even when an apparently unjust result must follow? Watkins had
served in the Army for fourteen years. His record was full of com-
mendations. His officers had judged him to be an outstanding soldier.
It would be unjust to allow the Army to banish him because he had
been honest and forthright about his homosexuality. The Watkins
court's tortured reading of Hardwick is a direct result of its duty to
obey precedent. The dissent captured the essence of the court's
dilemma:
I believe that the Supreme Court egregiously misinterpreted the Constitution
in Hardwick. In my view, Hardwilck improperly condones official bias and
prejudice against homosexuals, and authorizes the criminalization of conduct
that is an essential part of the intimate sexual life of our many homosexual
citizens, a group that has historically been the victim of unfair and irrational
treatment. I believe that history will view Hardwick much as it views Pless,
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). And I am confi-
dent that, in the long run, Hardwick, like Plessy, will be overruled by a wiser
and more enlightened Court.78
Apparently, the Watkins decision, even if not overruled, will not
result in any increased legal recognition of homosexuals as first-class
citizens with first-class rights. However, the decision could be seen as
an act of judicial disobedience. In this respect, Watkins echoes some
of the historical slavery and civil rights cases. The final lesson of Wat-
kins may be that sometimes a just result can be achieved despite the
apparent confines of unjust precedent.
76. Id. at 1351.
77. Of course, these two philosophies are not mutually exclusive. All laws are argua-
bly based on moral principles. The underlying distinction is that legal coercion is
not justified to alter behavior which does not harm others-behavior that, in this
instance, merely offends the sensibilities of a perceived majority. See Hart, Im-
morality & Treason, in THE LAw As LrrERATURE 220 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1961);
Mill, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS (1975).
78. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
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ADDENDUM
Since the writing of this Note, Watkins I and Watkins II were
withdrawn after full court review. The court held that the Army
could not refuse to reenlist Watkins, but based its holding solely on
equitable estoppel grounds.79
Rodrick W. Lewis '90
79. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir 1989).
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